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Introduction
The history of markets for some types of art and artefacts is suggestive
of dynamism that is not common in other markets. Most noticeable is
the rapid growth of theinternational and domestic market for Aus-
tralian Aboriginal art and artefacts since the 1970S, and the develop一
ment of the domestic market for New Zealand Maori artefacts recent-
ly. While changes in tastes and preferences are possible, the impor-
tance of the "bandwagon" phenomenon in these markets appears to be
more than a simple shift in preferencesl. We aim to apply bandwagon
§ The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance of the Contestable
Research Fund, Waikato Management School, and the support and encourage一
ment for this paper by Professor Hirofumi Horie. From his wealth of knowledge,
Zoumana Traore provided invaluable insights into the African art market.
1) The term bandwagon good was introduced to the modern microeconomic
literature by Leibenstein (1950).
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effects and network externalities to explain the strong growth in the
market for Maori artefacts in New Zealand. In the last four years or
so the secondary market for such art has boomed, rising from a once-
ignored sector of the art world to become a source of intense financial,
academic and media interest. Prices paid for Maori artefacts in New
Zealand are now often higher than those in New York, the world centre
for tribal art. Understanding the role of network externalities in
influencing the Maori artefact market may shed light on a wide range
of issues, as diverse as financial investment strategies, academic
research on fads, and government policy on cultural heritage preserva-
tion.
The literature on cultural economics has long recognised the impor-
tance of taste and supply evolution and dynamics in explaining some of
the important characteristics of cultural markets. Network models
emphasise the role of consumption by others in influencing perceptions
of value, rather than the experience of the individual or learning
through consumption. The evaluation of tastes is driven by what others
do, not what the individual does. While art and cultural markets do not
have the same physical characteristics as telephone networks or fax
machines, where the greater the number of people who are connected
the greater the value of membership, they do have some of the charac-
teristics that are key to understanding network goods, including the
externalities resulting from common consumption or consumption
complementarities.
In this paper we place New Zealand museums at the forefront of
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network externalities in the Maori artefact market2. As we shall show,
there was an abrupt and sustained rise in artefact prices from around
2002, after a lengthy period of low, stable prices. Per capita GDP rises
have been steady over this period, With no sharp increase to explain the
sudden jump in the Maori artefact prices. While certain categories of
the art market in general have shown rapid price growth, such as for
contemporary paintings, others have declined, including historical
paintings. The boom in New Zealand's general art market started in
1999, Well ahead of the rise in Maori artefact prices. And of artefact
prices overall, including those of African and Oceanic origin, Only
Maori pieces have shown outstanding price performance. Such facts
and the timing of the artefact market upswing point to an unexpected
source of the price rises:the extensive revamping of, and publicity
surrounding, the Auckland War Memorial Museum's exhibitions of
Maori artefacts. The renovation and extension of the Maori displays
was completed in the late 1990S-interest in Maori artefacts surged
within a couple of years.
Network goods and the art market
Following Economides (1996) , Consumption complementarities in art
markets may be direct, i.e. individual consumers may place a higher
value on art or artefacts of a particular type if they are aware that
2) The (implicit) Concept of network externalities in art is not new. The former
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the British Museum, Lord Eccles (1968) ,
argued against indiscriminate purchase of artworks by museums. In his view,
reducing the scope for private individuals to possess and display art in their
homes would limit the person-to-person transmission of art appreciation and
enthusiasm within society.
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Others are also consumers or owners. Complementarities may also be
indirect. For example, a larger market or more transactions of art of
a particular type may be associated with greater liquidity or ease of
sale and purchase, thicker and less risky markets, more media expo-
sure, the existence of more art advisors and experts, more variety
within the type of art, and more overall visibility3. All of these factors
may result in externalities from common consumption or networks, and
all are driven by the consumption of others, not the experience of the
individual.
Further developments of models like these may enable other important
aspects of art markets to be analysed in more detail. While purchases
of art for private collections that are not shown publicly may provide
some externalities from common consumption as outlined above, pur-
chases by private individuals and organisations or public institutions
that result in public display are likely to have a larger impact on
perceived values. The subsidization of public display could be in the
interest of the art community. Further, what is important for the
expansion of demand is display to the population of buyers who might
purchase art.
A key player in the display of art and artefacts is the museum.
Museums, private collecting and the art market are strongly connected.
Museums act as arbiters of taste and influence oplnlOn, assist in the
development of connoisseurship by collectors, and provide information
3) See Economides and Siow (1988) for a formal model of the impact of market
thickness.
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0n the importance and authenticity of artefact categories and individual
pieces. Collectors value the endorsement of their pieces by respected,
independent authorities (Chanin 1990). Art historians and museum
curators supply such endorsement either directly via inspection of an
item or indirectly through display of similar items. The problem for
collectors, particularly in emerging artefact markets, is that of deter一
mining the desirability of an object under consideration. By their
actions in chooslng tO exhibit a certain category of artefact, museum
curators provide implicit signals regarding the importance of the
category, its place in art history, and the desirability of the objects in
the category. Museums are considered the repository of important
material, reflecting significant aesthetic and epistemological views
(Pearce 1998). The museums'signals can accelerate the growth in
demand of the artefacts, i.e. enhance network effects.
The network effects are complemented by the growth in the knowledge
of collectors. Connoisseurship on the part of collectors depends on an
informed and exercised eye. The scholarship attending museum dis-
plays informs connoisseurship. The best pieces are exhibited, helping
collectors to define quality. The pieces may be key examples in the
development of an artistic style, educating the collector in the salient
characteristics of that style (which he or she can then compare with
pieces on offer in the secondary market). The breadth of a museum
exhibition opens a potential collector's eyes to a new ways of seeing
artefacts as art, as opposed to craft-such changes in tastes widen the
pool of buyers. For purchases in the secondary market, particulariy
auctions, heightened connoisseurship can be decisive in split second
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decisions whether to buy or not4. Personal taste and knowledge are
crucial determinants of a collector's willingness to continue to buy art.
Whether intentional or not, museums can have a significant impact on
the development of taste and knowledge of buyers at large, and on their
willingness to pay increasing prices for artefacts.
By their purchase decisions, Collectors provide information to others
about particular categories of artefact that are desirable or growing in
popularity. As collectors compete to obtain artefacts of this category,
the price rises spur the growth of a specialised market. But as more
buyers enter the market and artefact prices rise, the market supply
begins to include forgeries. The problems relating to authenticity in
artefact markets result from informational asymmetries between the
producer/seller of a piece and the buyer. Artefacts deemed to be
authentic command prices many, many times higher than those of
reproductions, yet distinguishing between the authentic and fake can
often be difficult. Professional art restorers, for example, are highly
skilled in aging a new piece, typically by imparting a patina close to
that of an old, original artefact. But patination is only one of several
indicators of age and authenticity-the style, carving techniques used
and the quality of the carving also separate the real from the copy.
Here, museums play an additional informational role. Authentic pieces
on museum display are indicated as such, with provenance, history,
approximate age and details of the carving technique often shown. The
museum display becomes both a signal of the desirability of an artefact
4) As can knowledge that a museum curator is also bidding for the object.
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and a trusted reference source when a collector attempts to assess the
authenticity of an object in the secondary market.
The `market for lemons'suggests that when buyers cannot distinguish
the quality of an item, eventually only forgeries or more recent repro-
ductions will be sold in the market. To some extent this is the case in
New Zealand's artefact market, although more so in relation to Oce-
anic and African art. While forgeries or reproductions of Maori
artefacts occasionally appear at auction, buyers by and large seem to
be able to distinguish authentic artefacts from copies. Definitive
distinctions are often made with reference to production technique (eg,
stone versus metal carved) , carving quality and museum registration
(in New Zealand artefacts must be registered by a museum, after which
they can be sold to registered buyers but must still be kept in New
Zealand). Museum registrations and exhibitions play no small role in
overcoming the `market for lemons', providing a ready source of up-
close reference for prospective buyers in secondary artefact markets.
We suggest that the market for Maori artefacts in New Zealand has
been significantly influenced by the presence of museum displays. The
displays serve to establish opinion regarding the importance and desir･
ability of Maori artefacts and provide information to overcome the
`market for lemons'problem, issues which are complementary. The
establishment or confirmation of opinion initiates or contributes to
network effects;displays used as first-hand reference help collectors to
develop their `eye'and knowledge to support decisions to pay higher
prices for good pieces;and the ability to distinguish the forgery from the
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authentic prevents the degradation of the market. The first of these 
factors， the establishment of opinion or taste， forms the foundation of 
network effects， while the contribution to connoisseurship and the 
determination of authenticity augment and sustain the network effects. 
Evidence 
An important， publicised museum exhibition can influence market 
prices for art (Chanin 1990). To determine if this is the case for Maori 
artefacts in N ew Zealand， we examine price trends before and after the 
Auckland Museum revamped and extended its Maori artefact display 
at the end of the 1990s. The display renovation was very large-70 
percent of the significant Maori items held by the museum are now on 
exhibit. This includes 40-50 percent of the weapons， 50percent of the 
greenstone carvings and 80 percent of the wood carvings held by the 
museum5， which has one of the finest collections of Maori artefacts and 
treasures in the wor ld. The types of artefacts displayed range from 
large scale items such as a waka (canoe) and a meeting house， through 
to small scale items such as tiki (carved greenstone medallions)， clubs 
and taz'aha (fighting staff). 
To investigate the impact of the museum's new displays of artefacts， 
we obtained price data from the catalogues of several auction houses， 
namely Sotheby's， Webb's， Dunbar Sloane and Cordy's， for the period 
1993 to 2003. The prices recorded from the Sotheby's catalogues were 
5) Personal communication with Roger Neich， Auckland War Memorial 
Museum. 
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treated as being representative of the international price for Maori
artefacts. The prices recorded from Webb'S, Dunbar Sloane and
Cordy's were treated as being representative of the New Zealand price
for Maori artefacts.
Auction house catalogues only provide estimated prices for the pieces
that they are presenting. These estimates are generally stated as a
range which includes a lower and upper price. Acqulrlng the relevant
price data therefore involved the collection of prices realised at auction
for each Maori artefact in the sample. Sotheby's provide information
over the lnternet regarding the prices realised in their auctions. New
Zealand auction houses, on the other hand, provide information as part
of their catalogues. However, for both international and New Zealand
price data, the availability of realised prices varied. Often it was the
case that only the estimated catalogue price was available. Ashenfelter
(2000) suggests that price estimates given by auctioneers are highly
correlated with the actual prices realised. Based on this, We assume
that New Zealand estimated prices are not significantly different to
prices realised. Where the realised price for a Maori artefact is not
available, the estimated price is used to represent the realised price.
When the estimated price is expressed as a range, the midpoint of this
range is taken.
The data acquired from the auction catalogues were grouped according
to two types of artefact: u)ahaika (hand-club) and taiaha (fighting
staff). The reason that these categories were chosen is that each type
of artefact is common and therefore price data across the sample
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period were available. There is a greater possibility of comparing like
with like across the sample period through pictures and descriptions
than with other types of artefacts, such as feather boxes. This is
because artefacts within each of the categories chosen for our sample
have relatively homogeneous features. Note, however, that the data
include the sale of the Webster collection, a famous collection with
exceptional provenance and quality, that may introduce heterogeneity.
Several steps were taken in the analysis of the price data. The first was
to compare each of the artefacts in each category to artefacts with
similar descriptions across the time period. Where possible, photo-
graphs of the pieces were compared. For example, in the case of taiaha,
a traditional taiahawith whorl carving on its tongue, paua shell eyes,
and standing at approximately 1.7 metres was chosen as a benchmark.
Then for each year of the relevant period, taiaha that met this descrip-
tion were selected and the prices compared. As a result only artefacts
that closely approximated artefacts sold in other years were compared.
Next, each price was adjusted for inflation and plotted on the graphs
below. The final step involved selecting easily comparable pleCeS from
the international price data and comparing them to similar pieces from
the New Zealand data. This was done to show the differences in the
New Zealand and international prices for Maori artefacts.
Taiaha
A taiaha is a Maori ceremonial or fighting staff. In comparison to other
types of Maori artefacts, taiaha are relatively easy to compare with
each other, glVen their relative homogeneity. Despite this, during the
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Figure 1 : Taiaha-Traditional carviltg tO tongue, inlaid paua eyes
(1.3-2m)
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period 1993 to 2003, the number of price data was relatively low. Figure
i shows the results for traditional taiaha with inlaid paua eyes and
carvlng tO the tongue.
The figure shows an overall upward trend in the prices received for
traditional taiaha. As is evident, until 2002 the price for traditional
taiaha was relatively stable. This changed in 2002 where a sharp
increase in price is observed. This increase in price was maintained in
2003, suggesting that prices again levelled out after the initial increase.
Hand- clubs
Maori hand-clubs are a commonly auctioned artefact. There are
various forms of hand-clubs: wahaika, patu and kotiate. A wahaika is a
curved hand-club with a tiki form carved to the incurve of the blade. A
traditional wahaika also has the butt handle carved as a manaia face.
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Wahaik，αcan be made of wood. A patu is a simple form c1ub. 
Traditional ραtu are of a spatula shape with a rounded end and grooves 
carved into the butt handle. A kotiate is a flat， waisted hand-c1ub. 
Hand-c1ubs are usually carved out of wood， stone， greenstone or 
whalebone materials. We present price evidence for a variety of c1ub 
styles. 
Whalebone c1ubs carved in kotiate form have a reasonable degree of 
homogeneity. However， the nature of the carved manaia can be a point 
of difference between whalebone kotiate. Figure 2 shows the results for 
whalebone c1ubs carved in kotiate form. Figure 2 shows an upward 
trend in prices for whalebone c1ubs carved in kotiate form in 2002. 
Greenstone clubs 
Similar to whalebone patu， greenstone c1ubs have a large degree of 
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Figure 3 : Greemstone Club (27-38cm)
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homogeneity. As a result, greenstone clubs are relatively easy to
compare. Figure 3 shows the results for greenstone clubs. The figure
suggests a general increase in prices for greenstone clubs, particularly
from 2001/2002. In 2002 a large number of price points were observed.
If the average is taken from 2002, excluding the Webster pieces, the
price sits around the $6,000 mark which is consistent with a general
price increase. The fact that in 2003 the price remained relatively high
supports the observation.
Wooden clubs
Wooden clubs of wahaika form are relatively heterogeneous. Figure 4
shows the results for wooden clubs carved　in　u)ahaika form. This
diagram seems to show a significant general increase in price for
wooden wahaika, again from 2002. In 2002 the prices received rose
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dramatically with two very high outliers. The 2003 Observation, while
lower than the prices observed in 2002, supports the conclusion that
prices rose over prices from the previous decade.
Despite the small number of observations in our sample of Maori
artefacts, the data consistently show a general increase in prices in the
sample period, With the data strongly supporting a sharp increase in
pricesin2002 and onwards. Both traditional taiaha and greenstone
clubs showed a sharp price increase in 2002. The data for these two
categories are important, given the larger number of observations for
both categories compared with others in the sample and given their
homogeneous nature.
The view that a general increase in price occurred over the last few
years is supported by some other observations of the market for Maori
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artefacts. Auction houses have recently increased the detail of their
descriptions of artefacts in their catalogues, and an increasing number
of Maori artefacts with museum registration are being put up for
auction. These commercial responses are consistent with prlCe rises in
the secondary market.
∫nternational prlCeS
The Antiquities Act 1975 places restrictions on the market for Maori
artefacts in New Zealand, particularly on the export of Maori
artefacts. It may be reasonable to expect, then, that prices received for
artefacts on the international market should be significantly higher
than the prices received in New Zealand. This expectation was con-
firmed by one New Zealand auctioneer, who stated that "[t]he
Antiquities Act has historically kept prices lower than those obtainable
on the world market6."
But does this view still hold in the face of the network externalities
discussed above? With the recent increases in prices in the New Zealand
market for Maori artefacts it appears that New Zealand prices are now
not significantly different to international prices. Andrew Grigg of
Dunbar Sloane stated that "now our market is very comparable (price
wise) to that internationally." To determine the validity of this view,
We compared recent New Zealand and international prices, using
Sotheby's New York and Paris auction results as a proxy for interna-
tional prices. The standard of artefacts auctioned through Sotheby's is
6) Personal communication, Andrew Grigg (Dunbar Sloane, Wellington).
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generally very high. Thus it was difficult to compare some pieces sold 
in N ew Zealand to those sold on the international market because N ew 
Zealand auction houses sel artefacts of varying quality. To facilitate 
comparability， we restricted the comparisons to traditional taiaha due 
to their relative homogeneity. 
In 2002 the N ew Zealand price for a traditional taiaha with paua shell 
eyes ranged from $NZ7，200 to $NZ13，350; in 2003 the range was 
$NZ8，350 to $NZ14，000. Whi1e there were no taiaha sold through 
Sotheby's in 2002 and 2003， several taiaha were auctioned in 2004. The 
price estimates for these pieces ranged from ε1，500 toε2，000 
($NZ3，OOO to $NZ4，000). Thus the New Zealand price for traditional 
taiaha is currently higher than that seen on the international market. 
Conclusion 
The impact of heritage policy provides another example of the poten-
tial application of network models. Heritage policy typically restricts 
the export of important cu1tural heritage objects. In N ew Zealand， 
Maori artefacts cannot be exported overseas without approval from the 
Ministry of Culture and Heritage. The Auckland War Memorial 
Museum is one of the institutions that considers applications on behalf 
of the Ministry. It receives approximately 10 export applications per 
year， of which the majority are for personal migration reasons. Often 
permission to export is given subject to conditions that will guarantee 
the return of the object if something happens to the permit holder. The 
Auckland Museum suggests the number of artefacts leaving the country 
by illegal means is relatively insignificant. Intermediary buying for 
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international collectors does not appear to be occurring. If an applica･
tion is received which involves some form of on-selling to international
markets, it is automatically rejected. Therefore, the number of
artefacts leaving NZ to be sold on the international market by legal
means is likely to be very low.
The policy of retaining artefacts in New Zealand reinforces network
effects. It is likely that heritage objects of particularly high cultural
value would also have significant "common consumption" impacts on
markets for related cultural objects or indigenous art and artefacts. As
a result, changes to the degree to which these objects are available to
the public or are traded may impact on the development of these related
markets. For example, a change in policy that restricts the export of
important cultural objects could have a substantial negative impact on
demand in related international markets as these markets become
thinner. At the same time, if the result is an increase in availability and
trade on domestic markets. If domestic markets are separate from the
international markets in the eyes of consumers, then related domestic
art markets might develop. While the relationships involved are clearly
more complicated than is suggested here, it does seem clear that in
considering heritage policy consideration should be given the its impact
on related markets for indigenous art and artefacts. This is particular-
ly so since the survival of traditional skills in the creation of indigenous
art and artefacts may depend on these markets.
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